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Experts on terrorism tend to claim that 
Hamas has shown high sophistication in 
unleashing waves of terrorism and 
perpetrating attacks against Israeli citizens. 
Some have been inclined to argue that 
Hamas is involved in intricate attempts to 
hinder the peace process, to change the 
government of Israel, and to act effectively 
and in calculated dosages to instill panic and 
cripple morale among Israeli citizens. The 
truth, however, is that we lack full and 
adequate data concerning decision-making 
processes within Hamas, and concerning the 
ensuing mutual relationships between what is 
called the "political infrastructure" and the 
"military organization". We may even lack 
sufficient information about the coordination 
between various cells of the purported 
military organization, or between the two 
areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Some scholars even speak of several sub-
organizations within Hamas, linked by 
different centers and interests, and grouped 
under one social-ideological-religious 
umbrella serving as the main binding factor. 
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Since the forced release of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin due to the "Mash`al 
affair" and his return to Gaza, outside observers have sensed a certain 
restraint in the activism of the movement, not only in the implementation 
of terrorism. This might be a delusive calm, prior to their redeployment 
toward intensified action, or an attempt to ease Arafat's plight on the way 
to the second pullback. It may also reflect merely logistic difficulties. But 
could we perhaps view this as a period of Hudnah (a temporary cease-fire 
  1with the enemy in Islamic terms), and thus a deliberate policy imposed by 
the "political establishment" on the "military ranks"? Additional 
hypotheses could be raised, all suggesting that the movement has 
undergone a change over the last few months, yet all could rest on 
inadequate information and the next wave of attacks may now be in 
advanced stages of preparation.  
Hudnah, or "cease-fire," and certainly if initiated by Hamas, would indeed 
constitute real change, and not only at the tactical level. It would entail a 
significant shift in the social and political message of the movement to 
Palestinians in the Territories in general, let alone to its supporters. Any 
toning down of Hamas' inflexible attitudes toward Israel - accepting 
Israel's very existence as well as the readiness of national factions to 
compromise on an independent state on "half of Palestine" - is actually a 
step toward the inclusion of Hamas in the process of reconciliation as it 
has evolved over the last few years, despite all the halts and difficulties. 
This inclusion is crucial for Israel as well as for the Palestinian Authority. 
To some extent, it may sharpen the conflict within Palestinian society by 
deepening the "kulturkampf" between Hamas and the national leadership, 
which leans toward Western culture. Hamas would thus deflect its copious 
energy inward rather than focusing on violent struggle against Israel, and 
certainly when Palestinian society reaches the post-Arafat stage.  
Above all, changes in the radical attitudes and the political violence of 
Hamas against Israel and its citizens will attest that the movement is 
joining a process that is not only political, but also includes elements of 
reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians in the social, cultural, and 
economic realms. This is a process that could be called "reconciliation 
through association rather than separation”. The architects of the "Oslo 
process”, or at least some of them, began by seeking complete separation 
between the two peoples dwelling in the land of Israel. Nevertheless, it 
would appear that the process actually supports the working assumption 
adopted in this paper: Israelis and their leadership on the one hand, and 
Palestinians and their leadership on the other, have been affecting each 
other since the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a process that 
has consistently strengthened the links between them rather than their 
separation. Resting on this assumption, we have attempted to consider 
whether Hamas is capable of a fundamental change of policy, showing 
willingness to "sleep with the enemy" while it is still and in the long 
range, the enemy. The extent, to which this process of reconciliation and 
mutual influence might include Hamas, is part of the struggle against 
terrorism and political violence. From a certain perspective, this paper will 
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Akhra] of the war against Islamist-Palestinian terrorism.  
The Social and Political Messages of Hamas v. the PLO  
Hamas is a public movement drawing mainly upon two ideological 
sources: one is the universalistic Arab Islamic doctrine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which strives to amend Arab-Islamic society toward the 
reestablishment of a traditional Islamic state. The second is the Palestinian 
doctrine of popular liberation, which strives to liberate the whole of 
Palestine with the aim of establishing a traditional Islamic state. In both 
cases, the central factor in Hamas' pragmatic considerations is reliance on 
broad popular support and high sensitivity to public opinion in the 
Territories.  
Sheikh Yassin, who had led the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip 
since the Seventies, was the one who changed its attitude toward Israel 
from passivity to belligerent activism. Eventually, relying on the grass-
roots Palestinian uprising, he remained the only real force carrying the 
banner of the Palestinian "armed struggle" in the era of compromise with 
Israel. Nevertheless, Yassin has remained in Hamas the most faithful 
representative of the ideas and socio-political doctrines of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which he views as his first priority. Jihad is indeed the 
supreme value for the Brothers too, and members must prepare themselves 
throughout their lives for the time when the movement decides to 
implement it. Yet, on the way to Jihad there is room for pragmatism and 
flexibility, on which Islamic ritual sanction can easily be bestowed. 
Furthermore, the movement's extensive activity in all social, economic, 
and cultural realms is the key to the success of Jihad and of the 
movement's political course. This activity is accompanied by the principle 
of "endurance" [Sabr], as well as by the need to pause, occasionally, for 
organizational soul searching [Taqdir].  
The rivalry between secular national groups - within and outside the PLO - 
and the Muslim Brotherhood - in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank - is 
not a result of the Uprising, or of the Oslo Accord, or of the establishment 
of the Palestinian Authority in 1993-1994. These events only shifted the 
struggle from the limited arena of student activists at universities to the 
public domain and, following the establishment of the Authority, to the 
conflict with Hamas as the leading rejectionist element. The backdrop of 
this conflict, as emerges mainly in the writings of the Brotherhood but not 
in those of the PLO, are two contrasting worldviews relating to the 
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in general. Presenting these views as two conflicting worldviews, 
however, is too partial and simplistic.  
In the background are two deeper processes affecting Palestinian society 
and, more specifically, their influence on the Territories: the first is the 
development of the PLO, and mainly its "Gaza base”, which actually 
succeeded the Muslim Brotherhood as the central political factor during 
the Sixties. The second is the growth of a social and political structure of 
PLO supporters, particularly of Fatah, over the last decade; the 
mobilization of all political constituencies behind the "state in the 
making," and the place of Islamic factions within the power equation of 
this "state”.  
In regard to the relationship between the inhabitants of "Palestine proper" 
(referring to the Territories and, to some extent, to Israeli Arabs) and the 
Palestinian Diaspora, the course of development followed by the Islamic 
Palestinian movement, and particularly by the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
antithetical to that of the national movement. Except for a brief period in 
the early Sixties, the national movement developed outside the borders of 
Palestine, endorsing universal and Arab ideas in an attempt to adapt them 
to a unique form of Palestinian patriotism. Not only did the ideology of 
Palestinian nationalism develop outside the Territories but also did its 
organization, even before 1967.  
Since 1948, the controlling influences in "Palestine" had been 
organizations perceived as hostile to the national movement and to the 
idea of democratic-secular Palestinian independence. Beside them were 
other influential forces, headed by Nasser's Egypt and the Syrian Ba’ath 
party, for whom the liberation of Palestine was part of an Arab liberation 
movement rather than a wish to attain separate Palestinian independence. 
A situation thus developed whereby refugee camps, which enjoyed some 
freedom in Syria and autonomy in Lebanon, together with Palestinian 
graduates from Arab and foreign universities, shifted the task of 
developing a national leadership beyond the borders of Palestine. The 
rapid development of the PLO as a political factor that gained Arab and 
international legitimization during the Seventies strengthened the 
unquestioned status of the outside leadership. Aided by Israeli action in 
this direction, it blocked the option of a local leadership emerging within 
the Territories.  
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Palestinian people was intensified during the mid-Seventies. The PLO 
invested strenuous efforts in mustering the support of a vast majority by 
creating a young and institutionalized infrastructure of middle ranks and 
"foot soldiers." This infrastructure swore unconditional obedience to the 
PLO, and consistently refrained from perceiving itself as the breeding 
ground of a local leadership placed beyond the dictates of the PLO. Jordan 
aided the process of "shifting the centrality of Palestine outwards" first 
and then by Israel; it also came to the fore in two additional factors linked 
to the Palestinian Communists.  
Palestinian nationalists within the Territories, drawing legitimacy from the 
PLO, rose mainly at the expense of the Communist party, which became a 
Palestinian party after splitting off from its Jordanian sources in 1982. At 
the April 1987 convention of the National Palestinian Council, the party 
became to some extent part of the PLO, albeit without endorsing its policy 
of armed struggle. The decline in the power of the Communist Party 
helped the PLO to eliminate an obstacle, in the shape of a Palestinian force 
located within the Territories that fails to heed the dictates of the national 
Palestinian leadership outside.  
Until the Palestinian Intifada, then, we witnessed a steady process 
whereby the political center of gravity is shifted beyond the borders of 
Palestine, strengthening the external national leadership at the expense of 
local forces. The relatively large and well-developed national movement 
that emerged through it, however, was hardly affected by the local 
inhabitants until the Intifada began in December 1987.  
In contrast, Islamic Palestinian movements developed their ideological 
approach inspired by outside sources, but their organizational 
underpinnings were within "Palestine proper". Furthermore, two of these 
Islamic movements grew within the Territories themselves, attempting to 
develop and spread an ideology meant to serve the entire Islamic world. 
These were the "Islamic Liberation Party," which evolved as a Palestinian 
movement although it expanded to the Arab world, and the revolutionary 
arm of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which espoused the view that 
Palestine and its struggle for liberation provided a model for the liberation 
of the whole Islamic world.  
The Muslim Brotherhood is the prototype of an Islamic movement 
following a course of development contrary to that of the PLO. The 
Palestinian branch of the movement was established in 1945-1946, in 
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was the split between the political Islamic element and the national 
leadership, even if the latter was headed by a religious figure, Hajj Amin 
al-Husseini. The second was a perception of the Palestinian struggle as 
inseparable from the struggle for the liberation of the entire Muslim world. 
The growth of the movement after 1948 was marked by ideological and 
organizational subordination to the parent movement outside Palestine. 
Until 1967, the Palestinian branch in the Gaza Strip had been part of the 
Egyptian movement, or fully controlled by the Jordanian movement in the 
case of the West Bank. The two branches were completely detached 
territorially, while in the third area, where the state of Israel was 
established, no trace remained either of the movement or of the Islamic 
establishment as a whole.  
Relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood in both Egypt and Jordan had 
a vast impact on the Palestinian branches. The fierce struggle between the 
Egyptian Brothers and the government of Nasser led to a significant 
decline in the status of their members in the Gaza Strip and in their levels 
of involvement, although most of them did remain active and were not 
subject to imprisonment, exile or executions, as their fellows in Egypt. In 
the West Bank they were part of the Jordanian movement, and thus 
enjoyed relative freedom of action. But, at the same time they also became 
involved in internal Jordanian issues or in its relationships with its rivals in 
the Arab world, and lost much of their Palestinian character.  
Before 1967, Fatah had represented the main threat to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The path to the liberation of 
Palestine and the character of the state after liberation were key questions 
in the Brothers' relationship with the PLO. The central problem, however, 
was that the PLO and other elements, such as the "Arab nationalists" [Al-
Qawmiyyun al-Arab] came to be perceived as a tool for introducing into 
Palestinian society "heretic ideas from the West and its Arab lackeys". 
Youths from the Gaza Strip pouring into the PLO ranks symbolized a 
social and cultural change in Palestinian society. National strivings were 
not only a source of hope and expectations, but also encouraged social 
processes that were more appealing than the Brotherhood's Islamic call. 
The competition with the PLO thus took on a social rather than a political 
dimension.  
During the Sixties, relationships between the Egyptian regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood also deteriorated considerably, affecting the 
Brothers' organizational options. Competition with Fatah and the PLO was 
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Brotherhood and joined the new movement. PLO members, whether 
because of their previous membership in the Brotherhood or because of 
the religious and traditional values characterizing their upbringing, 
preserved a certain Islamic demeanor in the movement. Yet for the 
Muslim Brothers, this demeanor was not Islamic, and represented a threat 
even more dangerous. Contrary to Palestinian groups that upheld Marxist 
ideas, from which the Muslim Brothers could easily set themselves off, 
Fatah, was for them a secular movement in Islamic garbs. In practice, it 
encouraged secularization processes typical of Western culture, even if 
some of their members preserved Islamic ritual practices.  
The struggle between the Brotherhood and the national factions of the 
PLO thus assumed social and cultural dimensions. In light of the Brothers' 
organizational difficulties, their response was to emphasize their message 
[Da’wah] as a social welfare mission, at the expense of their political 
ideas. When the Brothers were no longer the main organization in the 
Gaza Strip, they desisted from their struggle against the Egyptian 
administration or against their secular rivals within society, choosing to 
focus on the crux of their doctrine: the amendment of society through the 
Islamic power bases remaining within their control. In fact, from the mid-
Sixties, the Muslim Brotherhood became an ideological movement that 
concentrated on religious preaching at mosques and on the running of 
secret charity associations. The creation of the PLO in May-June 1964, 
and the subsequent generation changes in its leadership, also symbolized 
the process of "away from the center”, from "Palestine", toward the Arab 
capitals. Israel's entry into the Territories in June 1967 accelerated a 
process that had actually begun several years before.  
The "changing of the guard" brought to the leadership of Palestinian 
nationalists a new generation of university graduates who had studied in 
Arab countries aided by broad Arab support, and had therefore lived for 
long periods outside the Territories. Some were residents of refugee camps 
in Arab countries, and even when they had preserved a close attachment to 
their birthplaces in "Palestine", these were often Arab villages now within 
the borders of Israel rather than in the Territories. Most of the new 
generations of Palestinian national leaders were refugees from Arab 
villages now controlled by Israel rather than permanent residents of the 
West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The 1967 war concluded a process that 
forced the entire Palestinian leadership to concentrate outside the 
Territories. After 1967, the national leadership - both that of Fatah, which 
gradually became the leadership of the PLO, and that of the Marxist 
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means of the armed struggle and the military and terrorist deployment. 
During the Seventies they also engaged in the building of a social and 
political infrastructure, which turned Fatah into the dominant force within 
the Territories.  
For the Muslim Brotherhood, 1967 seemed to mark no real change. 
Ideologically, they continued to adhere to the Islamic solution of liberation 
through Jihad, including the liberation of the Islamic State after its 
establishment. These changes in the national Palestinian leadership 
symbolized for them the continuation, and even the intensification, of a 
cultural process they perceived as bordering on heresy. Hence, they 
persisted in their efforts to expand their power through persuasion and 
social action. In the West Bank, and for many years, they continued their 
activities as they had under Jordanian rule, particularly since their 
economic base - the Waqf establishment - remained under Jordanian 
control and did not suffer from Israeli interference. Conflicts with the 
Israeli government on Islamic issues were handled by the Supreme 
Muslim Council in Jerusalem, without their intervention.  
It was particularly in the Gaza Strip that they demonstrated their powers of 
survival. In 1969-1971, there were waves of severe disturbances and 
active opposition to Israeli rule in the Gaza Strip, including acts of 
terrorism and internal violence aimed at imposing the dominance of the 
national organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, as 
opposed to religious individuals implementing the Brotherhood's policy, 
systematically refrained from any involvement. Preachers in the mosques 
were anti-Israeli and even anti-Jewish, but this was not a sweeping 
phenomenon, and they did not engage in any other activity. The 
movement in the Gaza Strip persisted on the line it had already adopted in 
the early Sixties. It emphasized the Islamic Da’wah, charity, cultural and 
social activities, and the distribution of imported Islamic literature, with 
the aim of expanding its influence.  
During the Seventies, the influence of Arab Islamic groups first and 
foremost the Egyptians, came to the fore in the tendency to view Arab 
regimes as part of a Western cultural plot against Islam. There were no 
differences on this score between the various Islamic movements, and the 
conflict focused on the ways of removing these regimes and building the 
Islamic State that would replace them. This became the dominant 
approach and spurred the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic parties in 
the Arab world to engage in a struggle against most Arab regimes.  
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struggle. The Muslim Brotherhood did not endorse the approach of the 
Islamic Jihad, which viewed the struggle against Israel as spearheading a 
solution appropriate to the whole Islamic world. During the Seventies, 
therefore, the struggle of the Brotherhood proceeded in the social-cultural 
realm, while nationalists provided a justification for it even without the 
Palestinian, Arab, or Israeli political context.  
An additional element developed in the Territories from the late Seventies 
onward. The national Palestinian infrastructure led by the PLO, and 
particularly by Fatah, gradually came to be perceived as the national 
leadership of a "quasi-state". This was mainly due to social changes linked 
to the development of education, and to demographic processes expanding 
the leadership ranks to include younger cadres as well as members of 
families that did not belong to the traditional aristocracy. The claims 
raised by comparable Islamic parties against the regimes in their own 
countries could also be raised, presumably, against the "Palestinian 
regime" in the Territories led by Fatah/PLO. There was, however, one 
significant difference. The PLO could not be presented as a regime that 
oppressed its inhabitants or acts in the despotic fashion attacked by 
Islamic groups in Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries.  
A further difficulty was the doctrine expounded by Sayyid Qutb in the 
Sixties, claiming that social and political oppression were the primary 
criterion in the Islamic struggle. Islamic groups took exception to the 
corruption, to the comforts enjoyed by PLO activists, to the waste at the 
expense of the "Palestinian people choking under the yoke of Israeli 
occupation", to involvement in inter-Arab conflicts rather than in the 
Palestinian problem, etc. Yet these claims were raised mainly against the 
leadership of the organization abroad, as the ranks of Fatah and other PLO 
groups within the Territories were not a justified target of such allegations. 
Even when these accusations were raised against PLO activists in the 
Territories, they tended to focus on issues of personal corruption, loose 
morals, and aiding the "Jewish enemy" by corrupting the young 
generation. Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic factions 
reacted as they had for several decades, by pursuing their attempts to 
amend society. From the late Seventies, then, the conflict with the 
PLO/Fatah remained at the cultural/social level, although for the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamic parties this level was not only no less 
important but rather closely linked to the political one.  
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Muslim Brotherhood during the Eighties, besides the cultural conflict, was 
a growing sense of power developing within both parties. A new dynamic 
had been set in motion, new power bases within the Territories that began 
to emerge as a political institutional infrastructure. The universities were 
the leading bodies, but other institutions also developed. Beyond their 
political mission, these institutions were also an instrument for developing 
a Palestinian cultural-social consciousness in the Territories. From the 
start, this consciousness evolved in a national-secular direction, mainly 
influenced by the new generation that had brought it about.  
But the new political infrastructure and the power centers it created 
introduced new "rules of the game" in the West Bank and later in the Gaza 
Strip. The political culture created in the Territories was the one set up by 
the national factions. To contend with them, Islamic elements led by the 
Muslim Brotherhood had to play by the same rules. The organizational 
development of the national factions brought along a similar development 
in the Brotherhood, although characterized by Islamic features. The 
foundations of this organizational development were not new, and were 
grounded in their doctrine in Egypt. Islamic activity at institutions of 
higher learning was also similar to that current in Egypt and in other Arab 
countries. The Muslim Brotherhood, in a limited fashion, had also been 
politically active in Jordan from the Fifties. What made Islamic factions in 
the Territories unique was their ability to contend with the national 
factions. Nationalists were portrayed as secular and as bringing apostate 
Western culture (some deliberately, like the left, and others innocently and 
involuntarily, like some of the PLO supporters), into the quasi-national 
domain. At the same time, the fight for Palestinian independence 
proceeding in the Territories gave Islamic groups a chance to participate, 
if not at the military level, then at the political cultural one.  
The struggle in the Territories, then, assumed the typical features of a 
struggle for political independence although, contrary to the past, it was 
the local population rather than other sections of the Palestinian Diaspora 
that were leading it. This process was sustained by the national 
infrastructure that had been building up since the mid-Seventies, which 
was also instrumental in preserving the PLO's most vital asset. Since this 
infrastructure was directed and financed by the PLO/Fatah, the PLO 
retained control of it even after its headquarters had left Lebanon in 1982-
1983, and Jordan in the summer of 1986. These frameworks remained 
committed to the various ideological factions within the PLO, and did not 
develop independent approaches. The only element that appeared to be 
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purposes, which had proliferated since the mid-Eighties. Ultimately, 
however, they fitted the PLO's strategic conception, proving that the 
struggle against Israel was not only conducted from the outside but was 
also the natural response to a "cruel and abusive occupation" from a 
people with a developed national consciousness. Some members in these 
groupings also identified with one or another of the movements within the 
PLO and, generally, all identified with its notion of liberation and with 
Arafat as the ruler.  
One consequence of the buildup of national power in the Territories was to 
hasten the establishment of an independent entity in the Territories, 
namely, in part of Palestine only, while conceding the need for a process 
that would necessarily require the recognition of Israel. This step was 
completely opposed to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamic elements. In their view, this would imply establishing yet another 
Arab Muslim State in the context of the national fragmentation 
characterizing the Islamic Arab world today, to be led by people bearing 
the banner of secular nationalism. Worse still, this state would join the 
existing Arab states serving renegade Western culture in its war against 
Islam, and preventing the Islamic word from establishing the great Islamic 
Caliphate.  
From the beginning of the occupation, the Brotherhood was prominent as 
a body that acted separately from, and for twenty years even against, the 
national factions. The development of the national infrastructure in the 
Territories as a "state in the making" gave the Brotherhood the appropriate 
domain for highlighting its uniqueness against the national elements. In 
their traditional strongholds - mosques, religious events, Islamic 
bookshops, charity organizations, and the Waqf system - there had been 
little friction between its members and the national elements. But when 
Islamists entered the main nationalist stronghold in the universities during 
the Eighties, they were forced to stress their singularity and create the 
rivalry.  
The struggle at the universities largely determined the essence of the 
contest that was to develop later, including during the uprising. The 
Islamic arguments against the Palestinian national leadership abroad, 
which, as noted, were inappropriate in the local context, began to focus 
increasingly on political aspects. Given that national factions in the 
Territories were in full agreement with the PLO's political line, the 
Muslim Brotherhood shifted their rivalry with the PLO to the Territories. 
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at the initiative of the national bodies, and the focusing of the Palestinian 
cause on the Territories and their inhabitants, gradually turned the local 
Muslim Brotherhood into a movement that was first Palestinian, and only 
then part of the international Islamic movement. The solidarity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which had strongly emphasized Islamic pan-
Arabism before 1967, was gradually limited to the area of the Territories 
from the late Seventies. As a PLO inspired national consciousness 
developed in Palestinian society as a whole, the Brotherhood became more 
Palestinian, and this was openly and concretely demonstrated in their 
involvement in the Intifada and in the Islamic Charter they published in its 
course.  
The insistence of the Muslim Brotherhood on following its own direction 
and preserving its character and uniqueness were wholly its own initiative. 
Nationalists, certainly those in Fatah but also in Marxist groups, did not 
seek conflict with the Brotherhood, and most of the friction between the 
two sides, at the universities as well as in the public arena, resulted from 
Islamic initiatives. When a "state in the making" started to emerge in the 
Territories, the Brotherhood began to act more assertively to expand its 
services and strengthen its influence. Public feeling in the Territories that a 
solution was in the cards influenced both parties to increase their 
expressions of support for one or another line. On the national side, the 
young generation was almost wholly identified with one of the PLO 
factions, leaving almost no political vacuum. On the Islamic side there 
was a growing feeling that, as negotiations intensified and the focus 
shifted to the Territories themselves, the ranks of those supporting an 
Islamic solution of the problem should be broadened. The passivity in the 
active struggle against Israel, which was displayed by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Territories and by Islamic and Arab elements, moved a 
minority of Islamic intellectuals to place Palestine at the top of their 
priorities and led to the creation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  
The emergence of Hamas at the outset of the uprising was a direct 
continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood. It marked a change of course 
rather than a new organization. The Intifada did not change the basic 
attitudes and the rivalry between the parties. Hamas, which symbolizes the 
enlistment of the Brotherhood as an active party in the struggle against 
Israeli control of the Territories, particularly its military rule, and as a 
socio-political alternative challenging the PLO, could have changed this 
relationship. The Brotherhood's abandonment of the policy of voluntary 
abstinence it had endorsed for over Twenty years when it joined in the 
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Palestinians in the Territories. Even in the Intifada, however, the Muslim 
Brotherhood consistently refrained from cooperating with the national 
leadership of the uprising and adopted a separatist line, both ideologically 
and organizationally. From the outset, its members claimed they had 
sparked off the uprising; they established their own organization and 
refused to participate in the "United National Command". From the spring 
of 1988 they began publishing separate statements, including instructions 
that differed from, and at times contradicted, those issued by the UNC. In 
the statements and publications issued in the Territories, and even more so 
in the newsletters issued by their supporters abroad, particularly in Europe, 
they persisted in a line that preserved the ideological split with the PLO as 
it had prevailed before the Intifada.  
In other words, all the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
uprising sustained the intense ideological rivalry that had prevailed before 
it. Their success in the Gaza Strip, and the expansion of their services in 
the West Bank, strengthened their sense of power and their faith in the 
justice of their cause. Their actions before and the uprising could be 
summed up as "swimming against current". Until the outbreak of the 
Intifada, this came to the fore at the level of the armed struggle and, during 
the uprising, in their stubborn resistance to any political process 
culminating in a solution that appeared to them only partial. Any form of 
agreement was construed as acquiescence with the "greatest cultural-
political enemy of Islam", namely, Western culture, represented in the area 
by the Jewish entity. The establishment of the Palestinian Authority, 
which seemed to many Palestinians as the preface to a Palestinian state in 
these areas, instituted a process wherein the Muslim Brotherhood could 
become the Islamic element struggling against the national Palestinian 
regime, as is true of other Arab states. These issues concern not only 
political questions or the peace with Israel, but also key matters on the 
Arab agenda in general: democracy and its meaning, Islam v. Arabism, 
and questions concerning the contest with modernization, where the 
parties are also fundamentally at odds.  
From the Eighties onward, then, Islamic-national rivalry assumed a 
dimension of vying for influence, as political expectations began to rise 
toward the creation of an independent state in the Territories. For the PLO, 
this state would be the end of a process implying the recognition of Israel, 
whereas for Islamic elements it was a stage toward the establishment of a 
Palestinian state over the whole area of "Palestine”. During the Intifada, 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the guise of Hamas succeeded in Presenting 
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considered itself synonymous with the Palestinian national movement, the 
Palestinian revolution, the liberation of Palestine, and the future 
independent state. Since its creation in May-June 1964, the PLO saw no 
legitimacy in any national alternative beside itself. In July 1990, the organ 
of the PLO Filastin al-Thawrah, published a special issue reacting to 
Hamas' platform, basically claiming that any deviation from the course 
followed by the PLO was totally illegitimate, and could even be 
considered apostasy:  
“The house of the PLO is the house of the Palestinian homeland. Hence, any 
attack on the PLO is an attack against the homeland. The organization is the 
state rather than a party within it, a fact that many of the renegades in our midst 
have long ignored. They have invested efforts in creating an alternative to the 
state-homeland-organization, and have drowned in the sea. Today, a dear group 
in our midst strives toward the same aim. We do not long for their downfall, but 
come to warn them. We wish to prevent them from falling into the trap devised 
by the enemies of the nation and the homeland. "Warn the close members of 
your tribe." We proclaim that the organization is the homeland and not a party 
within the state." 
The reality of a reconciliation process, whatever its difficulties for the 
Palestinian or the Israeli sides, removes a common denominator that had 
developed in the course of the Eighties, and particularly during the 
uprising. During this period, Islamic concepts such as Shahid (Martyr), 
Istishhad (Martyrdom), Jihad or mujahidin, in their Islamic denotation, 
had penetrated Palestinian political culture in the Territories. These 
concepts, used against Israel and Israeli rule, could also become current 
among Palestinian Islamic groups against the national-secular Palestinian 
"regime". On the other hand, one must remember that Islamic and 
Palestinian movements, and foremost among them the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whether or not as Hamas, hold important assets, social and 
cultural, within Palestinian society. These might ultimately lead them to 
consider the payoffs rather than the disadvantages of joining the PLO 
"regime" in the Territories. After all, this movement still strives to amend 
Muslim society, and relies for this purpose on all the ideological and 
practical means modernization makes available. Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-
Sa'ih founded the Supreme Muslim Council in its post-1967 version, and 
for many years after his expulsion from Israel headed the Palestinian 
National Council. He could very well represent the hidden wish of the 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood: to turn the national movement into an 
Islamic one rather than to replace it. In an article published as early as 
1977 in the main periodical of Al-Azhar in Egypt, Sheikh al-Sa'ih traced 
the profile of the Islamic state:  
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Muslims become aware of divine justice, Islamic freedom and human principles. 
No exploitation, either of Muslims or non-Muslims, will prevail in this society. 
There will be no harm to the freedom or the property of Muslims or non-
Muslims. We want a state where the citizen will make a decent living, will not 
be unemployed, and will be humbled only before Allah”. 
Beyond the rhetoric, this text brings together the national democratic state 
of the PLO, and the principles of an Islamic movement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood variety.  
 
The Organizational Approach of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Territories  
The Brotherhood's main formula in the Territories, particularly in the two 
decades preceding the Intifada, was to focus on community action. They 
thereby gained a foothold in several public sectors, mainly in the Gaza 
Strip but also in the West Bank. They focused on what they called Da`wah 
- community development and the provision of welfare services to broad 
sectors of the public, not necessarily religious ones. The principles of their 
Da`wah did not differ from those of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
according to the pattern set by Hassan al-Banna in his lifetime, although 
the relative freedom of action they enjoyed under Israeli rule enabled them 
to expand their activities. 
The organizational doctrine of the Brotherhood in the Territories rests on 
three basic principles:  
1.  Preserving the organizational structure of the movement.  
2.  Clearly separating the internal activity of the movement and the 
instruction (Tarbiyyah) of its members from its public Islamic 
activity.  
3.  Stressing the uniqueness of the movement's organizational 
approach and its doctrine (Manhaj), as opposed to those of other 
Islamic movements.  
The stress on the Brotherhood's Manhaj as opposed to that of other 
Islamic groups, together with the freedom of action they enjoyed, turned it 
into a closed organization unwilling to cooperate with other groups, 
whether Islamic or national. In the Gaza Strip there was almost no 
competition from other Islamic groups, until the growth of the Islamic 
Jihad in the mid-Eighties. In the West Bank the movement endured limited 
competition from the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), 
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and from Islamic groups that had no political aims. Not only were the 
latter no rival, but they actually encouraged socio-cultural processes 
entailing a return to Islam that, ultimately, worked in favor of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the dominant Islamic element. The Islamic Liberation 
Party also functioned as a closed group fiercely preserving its 
independence, entangled in a turbulent struggle with the regime.  
The Brotherhood had no political rivals in the West Bank either. The main 
ideological rival was the Jordanian Communist party that, from the early 
Fifties, had also been harassed by the Jordanian government both in 
Jordan and in the West Bank. Other groups, such as the Ba’ath Party and 
national and Marxist Palestinian factions active in Jordan during the 
Sixties, were persecuted or restrained by the government until the fatal 
blow of "Black September" 1970.  
This reality marked by an absence of real political rivals until 1967 and in 
the Islamic domain even until the Eighties, led to a standstill in the 
organizational approach of the Brotherhood in the Territories. In the West 
Bank, they also retained their affiliation with the Jordanian parent 
movement for a long time, and remained part of the Waqf Islamic 
establishment. This establishment remained closely allied the Jordanian 
government, even after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and even 
after King Hussein announced the separation of the two banks in July 
1988. Unlike the situation in the West Bank, where the Waqf had 
remained under Jordanian control, no trace of Egyptian rule was left in the 
Gaza Strip. The Waqf and the mosques there were loosely controlled by 
Israeli military rule, and by the civil administration that succeeded it in 
1981. Therefore, while concentrating on Islamic communal-cultural 
activity, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to develop a relatively broad 
Islamic infrastructure that included dozens of private mosques, almost 
without interference from the Israeli government and sometimes with its 
encouragement.  
Since the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups kept away from the armed 
Palestinian struggle in the Territories until the growth of the Islamic Jihad 
in the Eighties, their political rivalry with nationalists was to some extent 
blunted. As the Brotherhood placed stronger emphasis on its social-
communal-cultural activities, its rivalry with the national factions focused 
on cultural dimensions, almost regardless of the Israeli government. The 
national socio-political infrastructure developed in the Territories from the 
mid-Seventies turned them into a quasi-state. The weight of the Israeli 
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subversive or involved in terrorism, and had no effect on internal bases of 
power, first and foremost the institutions of higher education. As these 
bases developed, at the initiative of nationalists and controlled by them, 
they sharpened the violent confrontation with the Israeli authorities, which 
responded by strengthening its restrictions. As a result, broader sectors 
entered into the confrontation, and increasing sections of the population in 
the Territories challenged Israeli rule and acquired a national political 
awareness. Led by the PLO, this awareness took an increasingly national-
secular character; given the withdrawal of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
any active confrontation with Israeli rule, Islamists came to feel more 
culturally threatened by Palestinian nationalists than by the Israelis. The 
encouragement they drew from the Islamic revival in the Arab world, and 
particularly in Egypt, shifted their concern to a confrontation with those 
who were actually perceived as the dominant element in the Palestinian 
public - the PLO and its components. The institutions of higher learning 
created a new focus, which turned into an arena of internal political-
cultural confrontation and was almost unconnected to the Israeli 
administration.  
The emergence of a socio-political infrastructure, as well as the incipient 
signs of independent Palestinian institutions in the Territories, led to a 
cultural-social confrontation over the character of the quasi-state, 
resembling circumstances in other Arab states. The Tarbiyyah of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which had consistently combined the cultural and 
political levels, became central. Furthermore, given that the growth of the 
secular national infrastructure was accompanied by the intensive 
development of a social-communal infrastructure, the Brotherhood's focus 
on a similar realm of activity became highly relevant in their contest with 
national elements active in the same domain. Since this was a society 
involved in a national liberation struggle, violence was directed against the 
Israeli occupiers, while the inner contest between Islamic and national 
elements remained relatively bloodless, limited to cultural and social 
competition and vying for elected office. These developments gave strong 
impetus to the organizational activity of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
particularly in the Gaza Strip, where they acted as totally independent 
agents, free from all external influences or organizational links with other 
Islamic fellows. This momentum also led to the distribution of their own 
teaching material, used to instruct their members and to emphasize the 
cultural and educational foundations of their doctrine.  
  17The most prominent element in the Tarbiyyah of the Brotherhood is the 
stress on the group as vital component of its activity. The group must 
conduct itself in an orderly and appropriate manner, as it is surrounded by 
enemies and acting within a community of heretics. In fact, the Islamic 
community is under siege, and the group is one of its most important 
means of defense. Furthermore, the dangers lurking on the path of the 
Islamic public and the Islamic group are not only external but also 
internal, and the Muslim Brothers must be in "constant readiness" and take 
defensive measures (Wiqayah) against them. The sense of siege is twofold, 
including the wider circle of the community that can be defined as Islamic 
and, within it, the Islamic group functioning in a more limited circle. 
Hence, the group feels itself under siege when faced with the broad 
"heretic" community, but faces danger even within it. It must therefore act 
in great secrecy, and instruct in its methods only the most reliable sections 
of the public. Its foremost organizational tool in the practice of secrecy is 
the "family" ('Usrah), the basic cell of the movement. The 'Usrah is not 
equivalent to the organizational cell common in other movements or 
parties but rather, as its name indicates, a family. Its aim is, inter alia, to 
develop a setting in which members are not only movement activists but 
also united in a familial framework and solidarity.  
The internal material that the Muslim Brothers distribute among their 
activists in the Territories includes no references to the Israeli-Jewish or 
non-Muslim government controlling the area, or to the reality of life 
within the Territories. The focus is on an Islamic group active in a 
renegade Muslim society. Partly, this is a result of the material's reliance 
on literature issued by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria, as attested 
by the list of sources and the suggestions for further reading. Nevertheless, 
the reason could also be that the Islamic social revolution, and the 
activities concerned with halting the "social erosion" of secularism, were 
perceived as more burning problems than the Israeli occupation. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Brotherhood's activity is to prepare 
Muslim society for a Jihad designed to bring about a renewed Islamic 
state. This aim is to be achieved only when most of society has adopted 
their views and amended their ways in light with their approach.  
This approach characterized their activities for the first twenty years of 
Israeli rule in the Territories in the years 1967-1987, when they 
consistently refrained from any confrontation and focused on the Da’wah 
within the surrounding Palestinian community. During the period of the 
uprising as well, when they joined in the armed Palestinian struggle and in 
the civil insurrection against Israeli rule, they continued to direct most of 
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emphasize the cultural struggle surrounding not only the ways of 
establishing the future state and its borders, but also its future character.  
One of the principles stressed before members and required from activists 
is the ability to contact the renegade society, avoiding seclusion and 
alienation from it:  
"The activist must begin his efforts within the circles of the 
faithful, but it is forbidden to withdraw and abandon the sinners. 
Many have been seized by modern heretic (Jahiliyyah) secularism 
(Madaniyyah), by the non-religious culture of the educational 
system, and by a search for amusement, and have never in their 
lives encountered a preacher or a guide. Their foundations are 
nevertheless good, and they have not developed in their hearts 
notions of evil, corruption, and decadence. They have merely taken 
refuge in them accidentally and due to self-indifference... Contact 
with them need not lead to their entry into the cultural framework 
[of the Islamic movement] for it to be considered wholly 
successful. This is indeed the highest level of success, but there are 
also others. The individual may remain throughout his life within 
circles of supporters and sympathizers, and we must benefit from it 
to the best of our ability, in form of financial contributions, secret 
information, or access to others. This link with the renegade 
society is highly instrumental: "This will enable us to exploit the 
renegade society, making it easier for us to eradicate its corruption 
and its government".  
The Muslim Brotherhood's Basic Perception of the Jewish State 
The approach of the Muslim Brotherhood to the existence of the State of 
Israel is not founded on a struggle against Israel or the Zionist movement 
specifically; rather, it is part of the perennial historical struggle between 
Islam and Judaism. This struggle, according to radical Islamists, begins 
with the attempts of Jews in the Arab peninsula to prevent the prophet 
Muhammad from spreading the true religion and bringing his mission to 
the world. This is a struggle between two worlds, when Judaism is 
described as seeking to abolish the power of Islam and prevent its 
expansion, thus paving the way for its defeat. The only answer to this 
confrontation, which is essentially religious and cultural rather than 
military, is to reestablish the great Islamic State. For this purpose, the first 
stage is to amend society through a political organization that will 
spearhead the Islamic cause in this cultural war. The amendment of 
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Islam, is the key to the eventual creation of the long awaited Islamic State. 
In other words, rather than a direct conflict with the West, Jihad is, first 
and foremost, a struggle to remove its influence from Islamic society. This 
influence has grown increasingly prominent during the Twentieth century, 
and particularly since the Arab states became independent. Western 
culture secured an important achievement at the stage of independence, 
when heading the newly established states were regimes that served the 
West and deepened its cultural and economic grip on the Islamic world.  
Taking this as their starting point, the Muslim Brotherhood developed an 
interesting approach toward the place of Palestine in their view of Jihad, 
with further implications for the struggle with Israel. This approach rests 
on two basic elements: one claims that Palestine is an Islamic land that 
cannot fall under non-Islamic rule. Jewish rule over Palestinian land is the 
most prominent symbol of Islamic defeat to its foremost enemies. 
Palestine, then, must return to Islamic rule in its entirety. The second is 
that the struggle to liberate Palestine from Jewish rule is not an end in 
itself, but part and parcel of the strivings to unify the Islamic world. 
Hence, liberation is not only the task of the Muslim Brotherhood or of the 
Muslims within Palestine. Liberation is a religious commandment equally 
incumbent on all Muslims, inseparable both from their own struggle to be 
released from the shackles of Western culture, and from the holy yearning 
to unite the Islamic world. What is interesting in this approach toward 
Israel is the paradox it somehow entails: on the one hand, Israel is Islam's 
foremost enemy in the religious and cultural confrontation. On the other, 
the immediate solutions to the problems of the Islamic world will be found 
within Islamic society itself, in the cultural rather than the military realm. 
Hence, the solution of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Palestinian or the 
Israeli contexts, fundamentally postpones the direct struggle with Israel to 
later stages, after the self-liberation of Islamic society. More than that, 
since the key to Islam's victory lies in the reestablishment of the great 
Islamic state headed by an Islamic ruler (Khalifah), only after creating this 
state and electing its leader will the latter be able to mobilize the Islamic 
forces required for the military Jihad leading to the liberation of Palestine.  
Hamas as Part of the Palestinian People 
The principles of Hamas sharpen issues touching on its "logic of Islamic 
terrorism," and particularly Israel's ability to influence this logic as part of 
counter-terrorism. Post factum, and as a matter of academic concern, we 
could ask whether it might not have been better had Israel released Yassin 
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in disgraceful circumstances, both political and operational. We may even 
risk asking whether Israel could have avoided the escalation of terrorism, 
and spared a considerable number of the suicide attacks that began in 
April 1993 next to Mehola. These are not fit questions to ask from those 
concerned with the historical study of what took place rather than with 
what did not. But since Israel is in the midst of a war against Palestinian 
Islamic terrorism, albeit with brief or prolonged periods of respite, this is a 
legitimate topic of discussion.  
Terrorism or political violence of any kind - religious, ideological, 
national, anarchist, or other - are not a "heavenly scourge," but the war 
against them need not be waged solely through the military means to 
which we have become accustomed during our protracted struggle against 
national "secular" Palestinian terrorism. "The Oslo accord" and the 
ensuing gradual thawing was, and still is, an important stage in the 
struggle against national terrorism. Even if this process ultimately fails or 
is suspended for a long time, or if Israel returns to another "round" of 
violent confrontation with the Palestinians in the Territories, it has won 
several years of an almost complete halt in the nationally-based terrorism 
of the PLO and its leading organization. Think of what could have 
happened had "suicide" attacks become current among nationalist 
Palestinian organizations, which would certainly have added social 
deprivation to the Islamic incentives encouraging such attacks. Israel 
would then be facing a kind of "Islamization" of terror, in a society that is 
in any event traditional and mostly faithful to Islam. This was indeed the 
case in two instances: the Palestinian stabbings that preceded the terrorist 
suicides, and the suicide attacks against IDF soldiers in Lebanon during 
the Eighties by national and Marxist organizations, following a series of 
attacks by members of Islamic and Shiite organizations (Amal and 
Hizballah). Palestinians we define as "secular" would easily be willing to 
engage in individual terrorism. Relying on scanty means, shouting "Allah 
Akbar" and with a copy of the Qur’an in their pockets, they would believe 
they are thereby turning into Shuhada' (holy martyrs) and engaging in an 
Islamic Jihad that is also social and national, saving not only their own 
souls but also society and the homeland.  
A perception of the political process as inseparable from the war against 
terrorism requires vision, and the ability to read the enemy's map 
correctly. Palestinians became increasingly adept at it from the early 
Eighties, as they gained familiarity with Israeli so. This familiarity was 
also crucial to some of the elements that sparked off the Palestinian 
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it also brought some of the PLO leadership, as early as the mid-Eighties 
and before the Intifada, to understand that terrorism was about to be 
exhausted and that if Palestinians wished to attain national independence, 
even if only partial, they must turn to a political process. Moreover, Israeli 
society was also ripe for change, and segments of it were even yearning 
for such a process, be it because of weariness or because they had reached 
"political maturity."  
The war against terrorism is meant to be waged not only in the realms 
dictated by terrorism, by resorting to defensive or aggressive strategies or 
to some combination of both. It also requires a social-political vision. An 
example offered here concerning the "logic of the war against terrorism" 
might evoke some angry responses as it touches a taboo - the logic of 
liquidating Abu Jihad. Abu Jihad was indeed a crucial figure in the 
terrorism sponsored by the PLO, and even more so in the successful 
mobilization of most Palestinians in the Territories to support it, either 
passively or actively. Had he not been killed in April 1988, a few months 
after the Intifada flared up in the Territories and was co-opted by the PLO/ 
Fatah, it is plausible he would have become one of its key leaders. Given 
the state of relations with Jordan at the time, which in July 1988 
renounced its political assets in the Territories, King Hussein might also 
have allowed him to return to Jordan after his expulsion in July 1985, thus 
easing his way to a leadership position.  
But anyone acquainted with his activity and his life's work, and 
particularly with his loyalty to Arafat, could just as plausibly assess that he 
might have become Arafat's right hand in the move toward political 
compromise that began in 1993. Furthermore, it is also highly probable 
that Abu Jihad would have become the central authority in the Territories 
on issues of security and the struggle against the Islamic organizations. 
The "Rajoubs," the "Dahlans," and other heads of the security agencies in 
the Palestinian Authority, as well as some of the governors in these areas, 
are his disciples. The Palestinian Islamic organizations also held him in 
great respect for reasons to do with his character and his relationship with 
them, in contrast with their open contempt for Arafat and his associates, 
described in materials issued by the Muslim Brotherhood long before the 
uprising as "swinging with the jet set in fancy hotels". It is not my 
intention to praise Abu Jihad here but to consider the shortsightedness of 
those who killed him. Satisfying needs for revenge among those who 
eliminated him in a brilliant operation deserving military acclaim, is not 
necessarily synonymous with political vision and long-range wisdom. The 
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"pinpoint targets," may preclude awareness of the fact that only a collage 
of points creates a full picture. One could counter by claiming that in April 
1988, at the height of the uprising, it was impossible to envisage the 
changes taking place in the PLO or the chances of a compromise. The 
answer is that a sobering process had begun in the PLO during the 
Eighties, even before the Intifada, and had been discerned by the Israeli 
intelligence community. The political echelons in Israel, however, in the 
two main parties and in the government of national unity, were not yet 
ready to accept this. The closure of the Palestinian headquarters in Jordan 
in July 1985, and the parallel expulsion of their members to far away 
Tunisia, had their effects. Furthermore, in March-April 1987, signs of this 
change within the PLO greatly hampered the ability to convene the 
National Palestinian Council. It finally met in Algiers following a forced 
compromise brokered by the USSR that brought the Palestinian 
Communist Party, which supported an agreed partition in Palestine, into 
the PLO Executive Council. The Soviets were even compelled to resort to 
the mediation of then MK Tawfiq Toubi, who was holding talks in Prague. 
This is not the place to expand on this issue, but hints of this change came 
from Abu Jihad himself as early as 1986.  
Let us now return to the logic, if any, of Hamas' Islamic terrorism, and to 
the possibility of Israel affecting this logic, not only for the sake of 
reconciliation but also as part of the war against terrorism. Contrary to a 
widespread perception, Sheikh Yassin is not a member of the Islamic 
religious establishment. He has no formal religious training and his title of 
Sheikh points to his role in the Islamic movement rather than to his 
religious standing. These remarks are not intended to detract from his 
erudition or from his status among Palestinians. Nevertheless, his stature is 
due to his mainly autodidactic training, and to his position in a movement 
whose unique interpretation of some Islamic principles has become 
religious law in Palestinian society, which is devout but largely untrained 
in Islamic subtleties, religious commands, or legal precedent. Sheikh 
Yassin is not the counterpart of Rabbi Ovadia Yossef in Shas party, or of 
Rabbi Shakh in Degel Ha-Torah, and he is certainly not a holy figure to 
his followers as are the Lubavitcher or the Baba Baruch. The 
organizational structure developed by Islamic movements originating in 
the Muslim Brotherhood does not rely on a venerated religious authority 
but on a movement with a clear message couched in social-religious terms, 
headed by a ruler or rulers that are not necessarily omnipotent. Hamas is 
such a movement, led by an ideological collective rather than by an 
individual. Ahmad Yassin's high public standing is not necessarily due to 
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to the status of a prominent symbol, not only for committed Hamas 
members but also for Palestinians as a whole.  
As noted, Hamas' driving principles a decade after its establishment are 
derived from two main factors. The first is that Hamas is a classic 
Brotherhood organization, with the concomitant social emphases. The 
second is that Hamas is part and parcel of a nation involved in a national 
struggle, whose main expectation is to end the Israeli occupation and 
attain political independence. At this stage, it is hard to characterize the 
Palestinian people as striving for peace. The peace notions of most 
Palestinians are not derived from the Israeli or Western perception of true 
peace between countries, but from the strong will of the people to end the 
occupation, an almost irrational wish never again to see before them 
Israeli soldiers or Israeli settlers. For Palestinians, peace is a result of what 
appears to them as a return of their lost honor, as represented by 
independence and by Israel abandoning the Territories.  
It need not bring Israelis to despair that they do not seem to share a vision 
of the future with Palestinians. On many counts, Palestinians have more in 
common with us than with the rest of the Arab world. For instance, for 
Palestinians of all classes, including intellectuals, the question of 
normalization (Tatbi`) with Israel is not in the agenda. This contrasts with 
the situation in the rest of the Arab world, where normalization is a 
paramount topic of discussion, particularly among intellectuals and among 
the more educated strata of society. Palestinians do not show signs of 
suspicion regarding Israel's cultural and economic imperialism, which 
have replaced the traditional accusations of Israel's military and territorial 
imperialism in the Arab world. Palestinians have an enormous advantage 
over the Arab world: they know us closely and well, including our virtues 
and flaws. Many among them, in the event of an independent Palestinian 
state being established in the Territories, would apparently be willing to 
accept Israel's social-economic "superiority" in the hope of exploiting the 
advantages of such a situation. Unfortunately, no one has yet written a 
much-needed comprehensive study about the renaissance of Palestinian 
nationalism in the shadow of Zionist-Israeli nationalism, and the possible 
mutual influences between them. Yet an impressionistic glance 
unsupported by serious research allows us to identify many elements of 
Israeli influence from the time of the British mandate until today, and 
certainly in the period since 1967. At least for some Palestinians, fair 
relationships between equals with Israel are preferable to close links with 
  24the Arab world, which disappointed the trust they had placed in it for 
many years.  
These developments must also affect Hamas, which, more than any other 
Palestinian movement in the Territories, has close links with the general 
public. True, Hamas has not abandoned terrorism in the Islamic garb of 
Jihad, and will not do so in the near future. As long as terrorism remains 
acceptable to Palestinians, as shown by the recent suicide attacks, Hamas 
will persist in it, at least in a cautious manner. If these attacks, or the 
Israeli reaction to them, become harmful to the general public and cause it 
to show qualms about them, Hamas will be forced to reconsider their 
value. For Hamas' leaders, the social and public meaning of their activity 
is no less important than its religious legitimacy. Nor has Hamas 
abandoned its anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist, and even anti-Jewish ideological 
positions, and will not do so in the short range. The hope of extending 
Islamic sovereignty over the whole of Palestine while denying Jewish 
sovereignty any rights over these areas will remain its basic aspiration. It 
follows from its belief in the eternal mission of Islam in general, and from 
the unique interpretation adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in particular.  
Yet it would appear, and particularly since the release of Sheikh Yassin 
and his return to Gaza as the leader of Hamas, that the movement is 
drawing toward a distinction between hopes and ideals on the one hand, 
and political activity on the other. On December 20, 1997, it was 
announced that Sheikh Yassin had declared in an interview he gave to 
Palestinian TV "the full liberation of Palestine will be the task of coming 
generations." Although he made different declarations later, this is a new, 
even crucial, notion. Yassin's statement immediately reminded me of one 
made several years ago by Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish who founded 
and led, until last year's split, the Islamic movement in Israel, another 
classic offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sheikh Darwish told me then 
in his home: "You have a dream of the Greater Land of Israel and we have 
a dream of the Greater Islamic Palestine. Each side has a full right to hold 
on to its dream. Ultimately, however, we will have to meet in mid-course." 
The Islamic dream, with its anti-Jewish connotations, will not die, nor will 
the Jewish Messianism of the Greater Land of Israel supporters. In 
practice, the logic of a just partition must prevail.  
In his years of activity in the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, and 
even before the uprising, Yassin had devoted himself to what could be 
called his life's work: the creation of a political, social, cultural, economic, 
and educational infrastructure, which is relatively impressive in the 
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enterprise. Everything was built according to clear principles defined in 
the communal organizational doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood 
developed in Egypt since the thirties. This infrastructure was built in the 
course of the twenty years elapsing between 1967 and the 1987 uprising. 
Israel did not interfere with this enterprise, and was even indifferent to it, 
revealing its failure to understand the nature of this Islamic empowerment.  
Led by Yassin, members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip 
consistently refrained from any violent confrontation with the Israeli 
government. Except for one scheme led by Yassin, which was exposed in 
1984, members of the Brotherhood had not been involved in hostile 
activities until the onset of the uprising. Even the conspiracy exposed in 
1984 never reached operational stages, although its members did collect 
weapons. Except for violent incitements against Israel included in their 
preaching and publications, they were more involved in conflicts with 
other Palestinian groups, particularly with the "Popular Front," than with 
Israel. Prior to the Intifada, they had been cut off from their fellows in the 
West Bank, who considered themselves members of the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood. The latter, who had maintained correct relations with the 
Jordanian regime since the Fifties, had no need to resort to the radical and 
militant approaches prevalent in Egypt, and this affected their supporters 
in the West Bank. They also enjoyed relatively broad economic backing 
from the Jordanian government, from members of the movement in 
Jordan, and from the Waqf institutions in Jerusalem and in the West Bank, 
where they were well represented.  
All these issues must be emphasized because, in practice, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had adopted a form of Hudnah with Israel before the 
uprising, as the above review shows. Had the uprising not embarked on 
the violent course it embraced in December 1987, the Brotherhood may 
not have created Hamas, although the challenge that Islamic Jihad activists 
posed to the young members of the movement was itself a significant 
factor in the militant approach adopted by the Brotherhood. The Brothers 
may have refrained from entering into a confrontation with Israel before 
the Intifada because they had wanted to devote all their energies to the 
building of the social infrastructure. One crucial issue worth mentioning in 
this context is the impressive restraint they displayed in implementing a 
policy that, unlike the armed struggle sponsored by the PLO as soon as the 
war ended in the summer of 1967, was highly unpopular. The popular 
armed struggle championed by PLO factions was supported by a majority 
of Palestinians in the Territories and brought the PLO important political 
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Bank. But the rising prestige of the PLO as a result of its armed struggle 
against Israel did not spur members of the Brotherhood to change their 
course. They remained passive witnesses of the violent struggle and, 
during the Eighties, even began to challenge the PLO's claims to 
exclusivity, as is mainly reflected in the intense political conflicts that 
erupted among students at institutions of higher learning in the Territories. 
Despite the undeclared Hudnah in their struggle with Israel, the Muslim 
Brothers persisted in their course, unobtrusively gathering substantial 
backing. Prior to the Intifada, support came to the fore in the universities 
and, in the course of it, in the enormous following they enjoyed as they 
"came out of the closet" and joined the violent struggle in the guise of 
Hamas. Their rates of approval were a surprise not only to Israel but also 
to the PLO.  
The logic of Hudnah prior to the Intifada is easily understood and easily 
explained. Although unpopular, their approach won the Muslim Brothers 
in the Strip and in the West Bank precious time for building their 
infrastructure, through a show of restraint and in line with the long-term 
view dictated by their traditional doctrine of stages. At this time, 
organizations affiliated with the PLO built their bases outside the 
Territories, while Israel indirectly "assisted" them by blocking any option 
of a genuine alternative Palestinian leadership. Thus, from the mid-
Seventies, we find that all the rifts within the PLO were echoed almost 
literally in Palestinian society in the Territories. In contrast, the Muslim 
Brotherhood became the movement most deeply entrenched in the 
Territories. Their social infrastructure gradually came to serve the entire 
population as a substitute of the services that UN welfare agencies could 
not provide, Israel did not think it should provide, and the PLO and its 
affiliates provided only for a small section, those active in the military 
struggle.  
Before the uprising, and particularly in the Gaza Strip, the Brotherhood 
was the most authentic public organization in the Territories. From the 
Seventies on, they built themselves up as an alternative to the PLO, not 
competing for power but as bearers of an alternative message. In both their 
guises (as Muslim Brotherhood and as Hamas), they questioned the 
exclusivity appropriated by the PLO in the Palestinian domain. Both in its 
stage of growth (1964-1969), and after Fatah became the dominant body 
in 1969, the PLO demanded recognition as the entity completely identified 
with the Palestinian revolution, with Palestinian liberation and, at the last 
stage, with the Palestinian State. Posing almost a mathematical equation, 
  27the PLO considered itself synonymous with the state, the homeland, and 
the Palestinian social and political revolution. All wishing to accomplish 
these aims can only do so within the framework of the PLO. This has been 
the nationalist perception so far, and most certainly after the creation of 
the autonomous Palestinian Authority in the Nineties.  
Two factions/organizations remained outside the PLO for many years, 
both symbolizing not only a separate organizational frames but also a 
different ideology: the Jordanian- Palestinian Communist party (which 
became an independent Palestinian organization in 1982) and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. As noted, the Communists joined the PLO, which had 
rejected them for many years, at the convention of the Palestinian National 
Council in April 1987 and due to Soviet pressure. The Muslim Brothers 
continued to stand aside and became even more opposed to the PLO. Even 
the Intifada, and particularly during its early, more violent stages, did not 
lead to a rapprochement. Both preserved separate organizations, and also 
attempted to direct developments by issuing separate proclamations and 
through a variety of events. The political moderation of the PLO and its 
readiness to enter a process of political reconciliation with Israel certainly 
worsened these relations.  
Two significant factors, which strongly influence its relationship with the 
PLO and may also have implications for its future relationships with 
Israel, affect Hamas as a movement with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The first is that in other Arab countries as well, and first and foremost 
Egypt, the movement clearly has no wish to assume power. Contrary to 
the impression created at times by the media, the Muslim Brotherhood 
totally rejects the approach favored by Iran's Islamic revolution, namely 
that of a regime led by the clergy. Their mainstream approach, and 
particularly in the last few decades, is to impose the Shari’ah or Islamic 
law as the only constitution in Arab countries, but without becoming the 
government. They strive to "Islamize" the Arab world through the law, 
without necessarily assuming control. Furthermore, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, 
one of their seminal contemporary thinkers and the true ruler of Sudan, is 
leading today the Islamic attempt to cooperate in Arab efforts toward 
democratization in the Western rather than in the traditional Islamic sense 
of the term. In its relationships with the PLO, Hamas strives to Islamize 
the process of building the Palestinian "state in the making" by 
emphasizing two elements: first, adopt an Islamic point of view in the 
struggle with Israel, namely, an uncompromising stand for the liberation 
of the whole of Palestine, and second, build the institutions of the 
independent state in the making on a religious basis to begin with. This 
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Rantisi, Jamil Hamami, and other activists in the Hamas leadership wish 
to take over the government. This implies a weakness as well as 
vulnerability - they prefer the ideological message to power and, therefore, 
do not try to challenge Arafat's leadership or his organization.  
The second factor follows from the Brotherhood's membership in the 
Salafi Islamic School, which strives to purify Islam and return it to its 
original conceptions in all realms of life. According to their approach, 
anything that undermines this aim is analogous to heresy, and leads to 
contention and civil strife (Fitnah). This is a recurrent message in their 
Arab statements, as well as in Hamas publications in Palestine. 
Resembling the Jewish saying about "the needless hatred that destroyed 
the Temple," Hamas members repeatedly speak of the danger of a split in 
the Islamic and Arab world in general, and in Palestinian society in 
particular. In the early years of the uprising, when the rivalry between 
Hamas and the PLO seemed close to bursting into mutual violence, the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, or Sudan did not voice unilateral 
support for Hamas. Hamed Abu Nasr, the previous "general guide" of the 
Brothers in Egypt and formally the leader of the international movement, 
met Arafat every time he visited Cairo and even issued joint statements 
with him. Hasan al-Turabi from Sudan mediated between the parties 
instead of serving as Hamas' advocate. Israel even allowed once a senior 
delegation of Hamas to go to Sudan for talks, hoping this visit would help 
tone down their activities.  
Caution and the dread of civil war are peculiar to Hamas in its essence as a 
classic Muslim Brotherhood movement. This caution is not a part of their 
essence as a Palestinian organization. The PLO/Fatah would be glad to 
crush Hamas and overpower it, if given the opportunity and a good chance 
of success. Hamas does not seek to defeat the PLO by eliminating it, but to 
prove that the PLO is mistaken and that only the Islamic alternative can 
succeed.  
Sheikh Yassin's reevaluation of Palestinian reality following his return to 
Gaza could thus be guided by two basic assumptions: one is that, although 
the road ahead may still be steep and rugged, the PLO has crossed the 
point of no return. In other words: the road to an independent Palestinian 
state, even if winding, is already being paved. The second and more 
important one is that the PLO enjoys relatively broad public legitimization 
to follow this course because of the high expectations it raised in 
Palestinian society. Crucial issues remain unresolved in the West Bank, 
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turning the maps of the future independent state into a mottled net. In 
contrast, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have a more genuine sense of 
independence, despite a small area of Jewish settlements at its edge. The 
daily expectations of most residents in the Gaza Strip, as opposed to those 
in the West Bank, are linked to political independence, but of a kind that 
enables free employment in Israel. They do not necessarily seek separation 
from Israel but wish to live by its side, exploiting the advantages that life 
next to Israel, and perhaps in its shadow, might afford.  
We must also remember that the population of the Gaza Strip is mostly 
made up of refugees originating from what is now Israel's Southern 
coastline (rather than, as in the West Bank, from towns still in existence). 
If and when residents in the Strip acquiesce to the existence of the state of 
Israel, their basic problem has no practical solution, as is also true for 
refugees in the Palestinian Diaspora. Hence, as a community with record 
birthrates living in a small and densely populated area with almost no 
arable land, their economic development will go on relying for a long time 
on hired wages dependent mostly on the Israeli economy, whether within 
Israel or in the Strip. In this context, Israel may find it worthy to re-
examine the effectiveness of closures, and whether they do indeed play 
any part in deterring or foiling terrorism. In the long range, the benefits 
ensuing from the contact between Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip 
and Israeli society could exceed the benefits ensuing from bringing 
hundreds of thousands of foreign workers from Third World countries and 
their problematical integration in Israeli society.  
Sheikh Yassin, who was arrested and jailed in May 1989, about a year and 
a half after the beginning of the Intifada and at the height of the uprising, 
was then part of a reality in Gaza strikingly different from the one to 
which he returned in October 1997. Not only because of the "change of 
government" and the consolidation of Arafat and his people at the head of 
the Authority, which from certain perspectives and for sure in the Gaza 
Strip is already almost a state, but because of the enormous expectations 
raised by the Oslo Agreement. Although he had been aware of events 
outside during his time in jail, nothing compares to "first hand 
impressions." If Hamas can be defined as the most sensitive public 
"seismograph" of Palestinian society in the Territories, then a man like 
Sheikh Yassin is its "registering needle." Hence, he could make a 
declaration after his release that implied an almost revolutionary change, 
viz., the full liberation of Palestine will be the concern of future 
generations. He preserves the dream of fully liberating an "Islamic 
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struggle over Palestine is only one pinnacle in a perennial Jewish-Islamic 
conflict that can only end with the defeat of one of the parties. He does not 
reject the Islamic approach relying on the Quran, and reaffirmed in later 
generations by radical thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, that "the Jews are the 
worst enemies of the faithful" (Surat al-Ma'idah, 82), "the murderers of 
prophets," "offspring of monkeys and pigs," responsible for all the ruin of 
revolutions inflicted on modern humanity, etc. He still sees the Islamic 
Jihad of Hamas as a basically defensive measure against what he considers 
deliberate and willful Israeli terrorism, thus justifying recourse to all 
means in self-defense.  
Furthermore, we do not know for sure that these potential changes in his 
thinking or in its open displays have begun to trickle down to the last of 
the wanted members of the `Izz al-Din al-Qassam cells, Hamas' military 
arm. It is highly plausible that some members of these cells, even at this 
time, are locating and collecting arms to continue their lethal attacks 
against Israel and Israelis, including what we call "suicide attacks" and 
they call "Martyrdom." It is not at all sure that this message can be 
"trickled down" by decree, even more so because the entire "educational 
system" of Hamas and is to instill into their young, from the earliest 
possible age, intense hatred against Jews and Judaism and not only against 
Israel and Zionism.  
This hatred does not rely only on Islam and its sources, or on the 
movement's interpretation of the principles of Islam, but on a strong 
Palestinian yearning for revenge. The hateful attacks perpetrated by 
Hamas have enjoyed, then and now, not only religious but mainly social-
public legitimization, and this is the crux of the problem in fighting 
against them. Whether or not religious rulings do allow suicide as a form 
of defensive Jihad, Palestinians, or certainly some of them have issued 
their own "rulings" by supporting them as the ultimate vengeance. He who 
stood as a young boy by a house that was demolished, or saw his father 
humiliated at a roadblock, or went through the experience of a "vigorous" 
midnight search in his own house that left behind broken glass and 
scorched earth, cannot accept the Israeli view of an "enlightened 
occupation" or agree that, as opposed to their attacks against us, we treat 
Palestinians with kid gloves. Feelings of revenge are never the result of 
objective perceptions.  
Beyond this, Palestinians have undergone a revolution over the last thirty 
years that, at least partly, has also revolutionized their thinking and led the 
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in the Territories changed the order of priorities in their collective national 
tragedy, which is the central element dictating their behavior. Through the 
Intifada, they largely imposed this change on the PLO. What could be 
called "the trauma of the expulsion" was replaced by "the trauma of the 
occupation." The feeling of Palestinians in the Territories, 70% of who 
were born after 1967, was that the Israeli occupation was no less of a 
catastrophe than the expulsion of 1948, as a result of which they may find 
themselves in a situation of existential danger. Their weight in nationalist 
Palestinian thinking became increasingly significant, but they still failed to 
create an alternative leadership. The organizational and ideological 
structure of "outside" Palestinian factions was preserved. Yet this was not 
only a case of altering the balance of power. Palestinians in the Territories 
underwent an important social revolution under Israeli occupation: from 
the mid-Seventies onward, middle class academicians gradually emerged, 
enabling meaningful social mobility.  
The development of universities, parallel to the growth of the Islamic and 
secular social infrastructure and the raising living standards resulting from 
large-scale salaried work in Israel, gave villagers and refugees a strong 
push forward. Palestinians had undergone a similar social change in the 
Fifties, when students in Arab and European countries (particularly 
Germany) became the leadership cadres of the PLO/Fatah and of other 
organizations. This development skipped the "aristocratic" families that 
had been renowned during the British mandate, whose prominence had 
been based on wealth and property ownership. Yaser Arafat, Khalil al-
Wazir (Abu Jihad), Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayad), Farouq Qadoumi, Dr. 
George Habash and Dr. Naef Hawatmeh, Ahmad Jibril, the brothers Hani 
and Khaled al-Hasan, and other members of the first generation of the 
Palestinian revolution, were not born to families that had been considered 
influential during the British mandate. They came up through student 
organizations in the Arab world and in Europe, which had espoused 
ideologies of social revolution through various means, some violent and 
some popular. One of the important committees in the "Western area" of 
Fatah, the central body in charge of terrorist operations against Israel 
headed by Abu Jihad, was the "organization committee." This committee 
was made up of students and academics, and served as a catalyst for large-
scale recruitment into the political and military activities of the PLO. Its 
leaders were among the intellectuals who flourished in Arafat's 
surroundings during their years in Lebanon. Some collaborated with Abu 
Jihad in the creation of a faction of the Islamic Jihad linked to Fatah, 
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February 1988.  
A similar transformation has taken place in the Territories, visible in the 
Palestinian leadership that has emerged over the last decade. Jibril Rajoub, 
Muhammad Dahlan, Saeb Arekat, Shaher Sa'ad and others, are a classic 
product of this change, signs of which can also be gauged among Islamic 
elements growing up in the Territories. The Hamas leadership is chiefly 
made up of members of the refugee generation with no claims to ancestry, 
who grew up in a society placing increasing emphasis on education as the 
catalyst to upward mobility (Israeli/Jewish influence?): Ahmad Yassin, 
Dr. Mahmud al-Zahar, Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Dr. 
Ibrahim Maqadmeh, Dr. Jamil Hamami, the late Dr. Fathi Shqaqi, and his 
successor to the leadership of the Islamic Jihad, Dr. Ramadan Abdallah 
Shalah. All are a product of this social change. The Muslim Brothers went 
even further when they took over the Islamic University in Gaza during 
the Eighties and turned it into the focus of their activity, let alone into the 
largest institution of higher education in the Territories.  
This social change was also very significant in shifting the Palestinian 
center of gravity from the Diaspora or the Exile to Palestine itself. There is 
more, however. The transition, the social change, and the process of 
building social and political institutions in Jerusalem and in the Territories 
prior to the Intifada was accompanied by the introduction of a relatively 
democratic political culture. The entire infrastructure of Palestinian 
institutions in the Territories: unions, youth committees, women's 
organizations, students' councils, professional organizations, cultural and 
social associations, chambers commerce, voluntary organizations, 
agricultural leagues, etc. - was, from the start, premised on yearly 
elections. These elections came at the end of intensive, and usually fair, 
campaigns, which imprinted Palestinian society in the Territories with a 
democratic, stamp. The division of the various groups according to the 
various organizations within the PLO on the one hand, and independent 
parties such as the Communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Islamic 
Jihad on the other, created a pluralistic society characterized by a level of 
political awareness quite exceptional in the Arab world. The result is a 
society with a highly developed public opinion, and with more than one 
movement or faction vying for power. The political culture that evolved in 
the Territories is closer, to some extent, to that prevalent in Israel than to 
the norms of the Arab world. Those who consider Arafat a dictator should 
actually wonder at his ability to maneuver between opposing lively 
factions in a dynamic society, particularly after he moved to the Territories 
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and Tunisian era.  
The social and personal changes in the national Palestinian leadership are 
also what enabled a rapprochement between the trailblazers of the Oslo 
process, which hammered out a political compromise between Israel and 
the Palestinians. Mahmoud `Abbas (Abu Mazen), Dr. Nabil Sha'th, 
Ahmad Kari` (Abu `Ala'), and their associates, rose to prominence outside 
the PLO's military establishment. So did Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, Dr. Ron 
Pundak, Dr. Yossi Beilin, and Uri Savir, who led the move on the Israeli 
side. In many respects, they shared a political culture that enabled a 
mutual understanding.  
The leadership of Hamas, although heading an Islamic organization that is 
not inspired by Western concepts of democracy, must take all these issues 
into account. Moreover, since Hamas is not led by a "Council of Elders" 
and has no venerated religious authority, it tends to act as a collective. Its 
leaders too are a classic product not only of the social changes that have 
taken place in the Territories, but also of a fundamentally Western 
political culture. Some of them emerged in the election campaigns at the 
universities beginning at the early Eighties. Men like Musa Abu Marzouq 
and Khaled Mish’al in Jordan, or Yaser Za'atrah in London, as well as 
other less well-known figures, have studied at American and English 
universities. Whatever the Islamic radicalism of Hamas members, they are 
not "obscurantist fundamentalists" of the Iranian stripe (nor are all 
Iranians). They are not willing, then, to reject all the advantages of 
Western culture, even when they refer to it as "Crusader and heretic." 
There is also increasing evidence that the idea of Hudnah with Israel might 
be acceptable to circles in the "political chamber" of the movement 
abroad, and has also found its way to the pages of Filastin al-Muslimah 
published in England, which excels at conveying Hamas' views. It is also 
worth noting that a concrete proposal, though we do not know how 
serious, was conveyed through King Hussein in the name of a Hamas 
member residing in Jordan, apparently Musa Abu Marzouq himself.  
The answer to the question posed in the title, then, seems to be yes. Hamas 
can decide on a pause, even a prolonged one, in its struggle with Israel. It 
can not only in the sense that it has the ability to do so, but also as part of a 
sober perception of the changing reality in the Territories. The political, 
social, and military activists of the movement will find it harder to see the 
daily change, as they are part of it. But Sheikh Yassin, who was cut off 
from his surroundings for nine years, can definitely see the vast changes in 
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as the new reality that emerged with the creation of the Palestinian 
Authority. As one whose life's work is linked, first and foremost, to a 
social revolution rather than to terrorism for its own sake, he may also be 
more qualified than his fellow leaders to assess the expectations of 
Palestinians in the Territories, and tone them down.  
Sheikh Yassin may himself have experienced the shift in the weight of the 
Territories in the Palestinian context. He may not only have moved from 
the "trauma of expulsion" to the "trauma of occupation," but may also 
have changed the order of priorities in the existential problems affecting 
the Islamic world. He began, when leading the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Gaza, by seeking solutions to the global Islamic problem in its contest 
with Western culture. He later shifted his focus to a violent solution of the 
Palestinian problem, with the establishment of Hamas at the outset of the 
Intifada, and is now making Palestinian independence at least in part of 
Palestine, and liberation from the Israeli occupation, the top priority. Signs 
of Islamic support for an approach placing liberation at the top of the list 
were already visible at the beginning of the Intifada, when Arab Islamic 
elements rejected Hamas' total denial of the PLO.  
Fahmi Huwaydi, a well-known Islamic writer and thinker in Egypt, wrote 
a long article in November 1988, immediately after the Palestinian 
declaration of independence. The article, which was carried by several 
important Arab papers, was entitled "What comes first - An Islamic 
Palestine or a Free Palestine," and his conclusion was that the first priority 
is the liberation of Palestine. The course chosen by the Palestinian 
leadership, then, seeking to remove Israel from at least part of the 
Territories through the uprising, is preferable to the efforts devoted to 
liberate Palestine while also fighting for its Islamic character. Hamas 
members responded by giving precedence to the struggle for a greater 
Islamic Palestine. Sheikh Yassin, who was jailed when Hamas upheld the 
ideal of a greater Islamic Palestine at any cost, was released when 
Palestinian independence, even if partial and certainly in its Gaza Strip 
guise, appears closer than ever. Furthermore, although the process of 
compromise with Israel appears to be stalled, Palestinians everywhere 
realize that Israel has also entered a path of no return as a result of the 
expectations of its own citizens, and that patience and moderation will 
bring them closer to their desired aim. It would also seem that most 
Palestinians in the Territories are not interested in a mutual war of attrition 
between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. They too, like the Jewish 
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reconciliation," which Sheikh Yassin is best suited to lead.  
No quick process of moderation, if any, should be expected. A movement 
like Hamas can easily speak in several tongues to different audiences and, 
if required, bestows Islamic approval on all versions. Clearly, and at least 
in the short range, we will see no moderation in the ideological attitudes 
toward Israel and the Jews. A change in Hamas' thinking can only come 
from a true assessment of the new reality, and a profound evaluation of 
how to exploit it to expand its ranks and its influence in the conflict with 
the PLO or the secular national movement, which is no less important. It 
must also be clear that a change of this magnitude within Hamas will exact 
a heavy price from Israel, from a massive release of prisoners and 
detainees and up to vast changes in an Israeli-Palestinian understanding, in 
the direction of an independent state in all the Territories and without any 
or almost no settlements. The moderation of Hamas may also strengthen 
Arafat's bargaining power just before the beginning of negotiations toward 
a possible final settlement. For some Israelis, signs of moderation within 
the movement will be a tragedy helping to speed up our exit from the 
Territories, just as the Oslo agreement was, and still is.  
It is important for Israeli society to know that signs of political moderation 
are also possible within Hamas, which is perceived as inflexible, and 
could ensure a pause in its terrorist struggle under the Islamic cover of 
Hudnah.  
Conclusion 
It must be noted that the present process of compromise between Israel 
and the Palestinian authority differs from the peace agreements Israel 
signed with Egypt and Jordan, and may sign with Syria in the future. 
These peace agreements were signed by regimes that imposed them on 
their citizens while most of the people, and particularly its most educated 
classes, have never accepted them wholeheartedly, to say the least. In the 
case of the Palestinians there is a process of compromise, even if slow, 
involving also the two peoples who have been chafing against each other 
for the last thirty years. The central emphasis must be on the word process. 
Like the Palestinians, Israeli society underwent and is still going through a 
process of transition - from a total denial of the other side to a gradual, if 
changing, willingness to accept the claims of the other, despite a long 
series of lethal suicide attacks. Until Ten years ago, the need for various 
forms of a dialogue with the Palestinians had involved only marginal 
elements in Israeli society. Today this is acceptable to much wider circles, 
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The struggle against terrorism, then, is not exhausted by preventing 
individuals or foiling conspiracies, but also by an attempt to expand the 
process.  
Since Rabin's assassination, Israeli society is showing less and less 
tolerance for attacks against Arabs or even for displays of "verbal 
violence" against them. Since October 1995, those who refuse to reach any 
compromise with the Palestinians have been pushed into a defensive 
position by a majority of Israelis. Through the process of compromise, 
Palestinian society must be brought to understand that it is an inseparable 
part of the struggle against terrorism. For Palestinians, a central feature in 
this context is that the process of compromise also entails changes in their 
perception of the threat represented by Israel. The need for a study, yet to 
be attempted, on the mutual influences between Israelis and Palestinians 
was mentioned above. Another crucial area of research still awaiting us 
concerns the sense of an Israeli threat, in the Arab world and among 
Palestinians. Israeli society developed on the premise of a perceived threat 
from a hostile Arab world surrounding it, together with the Jewish 
perception of "the whole world is against us." The state of Israel and 
Israeli society never stopped to check the reverse side of this principle: 
perhaps the root of the problem is also (certainly not only) that the Arab 
world in general and Palestinians in particular fear us.  
Fears of this type can often play a substantial, and certainly legitimate, 
role in the deterrent represented by a regular-armed power or in regular 
wars, but also in terrorism. Such fears, however, can also create terrorism. 
Terrorism is defined by many as the "weapon of the weak," but this 
definition carries derisive connotations, often lacking a deeper attempt to 
understand the sources of weakness and whether it is true or false. From 
the time of the British mandate and the expanding Zionist settlement in the 
Territories, through the uprooting and disintegration of 1948 and the 
occupation of the whole of Palestine in 1967, Palestinian society in the 
Territories lived with the sense that it stood before a threatening and 
insatiable power, devouring everything on its path. Palestinian terrorism, 
national or Islamic, was not only aimed at hurting and harassing Israel in 
the knowledge it could not destroy it, but was always the type of terrorism 
combining social revolution and political liberation.  
Since the Sixties, Palestinian terrorism was meant to steel Palestinian 
resistance and build a social "backbone" toward the contest with the 
"terrible and threatening" enemy. Fatah and the various Popular Fronts 
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not only political freedom and national independence but also "the 
building of the new society and the new individual within it." The Islamic 
movements, headed by the Muslim Brotherhood, have the same aim. 
Furthermore, until the Intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood considered that 
social amendment preceded the terrorist struggle against Israel. The 
Brothers see themselves within the Muslim Arab world, and particularly in 
the Palestinian arena, as the element contending with a threatening global 
conspiracy that is essentially cultural, where the Jews and Israel play a 
crucial role in mobilizing "Crusader" Western culture. The solution is not 
only in a return to the sources of Islam and the creation of a society that is 
strictly religious, but also in raising Jihad to the top of their priorities as 
the only means of building the indestructible backbone of Palestinian 
society. But the Jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood, and hence of Hamas, 
need not come to the fore, as most Israelis believe, only in terrorism. Their 
basic assumption is that this Jihad is a form of self-defense against the 
Israeli threat.  
The Islamic justification of Hamas' suicide attacks originates in the same 
defensive perspective, and thus easily allows for the adoption of a course 
ostensibly forbidden by religious law: suicide. The assumption is that 
Muslims in the modern world are subject to a permanent cultural threat, 
and only through Jihad will they secure the "backbone" suitable for 
contending with it. Jihad begins with a return to the faith, with the 
building of an Islamic society around it, and with the ability to resist the 
evil instinct and the temptations of the secular world. Israel is thus 
uniquely equipped to serve as a threat, not only because of its military 
power or because of the land that, in their view, it pillaged from the 
Palestinians. It is also a threat because of its cultural-social influence, 
which Islamic elements could not but notice.  
This approach requires the building of a society with the courage to 
struggle, based on a heroic vanguard showing the way to all. Islamic 
terrorism, then, is not only a response to the weaknesses detected in Israeli 
society, as many tend to believe, but also conveys the sense of a threat. 
The process of compromise with the Palestinians can be perceived as a 
show of restraint on the Israeli side reflecting weakness and a tired society 
that has lost its ability to make a stand. It can also be seen, however, as a 
threatening influence to Palestinians, a clever neutralization of their 
national leadership and its will to fight. The Intifada, a popular 
spontaneous uprising, can be viewed as an attempt to remove the yoke of 
an oppressive occupying power. But it can also be viewed as a cry, in the 
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abandoned. It was abandoned by the Arab world when its most powerful 
component - Egypt - turned to the peace process with Israel; it was 
abandoned by the PLO, which was forced to move to far-away Tunisia in 
1982-1983; it was abandoned by Syria, whose only contribution to the 
Palestinian issue was to foster rejectionist attitudes to every solution 
without suggesting a plausible solution of its own. The road accident on 
December 8, 1987 symbolized the Israeli threat in an almost picturesque, 
if tragic, fashion: the giant military semi-trailer smashing into a vehicle 
carrying weary laborers back from a day of work in Israel. Whoever seeks 
further parallels should look at the many caricatures drawn by the 
prominent Palestinian artist Naji al-`Ali who, in a rather ironic twist, was 
murdered in London by Fatah emissaries in the summer of 1987.  
The process of compromise with the Palestinians, which some in Israel 
view as reflecting a weakness and leading to a much greater one, did not 
arise on the Palestinian side from an approach seeking to exploit Israeli 
vulnerability, but from a perception of Israel as less threatening to 
Palestinian society. Palestinians gradually learned to exploit Israeli 
democracy, and first and foremost it's legal system, in order to absorb the 
political culture of Israeli society. The Palestinian press published in East 
Jerusalem in the Eighties often devoted about half of its pages to 
translations of articles from the Israeli press. Tens of thousands of 
Palestinian laborers who have worked in Israel over the years, particularly 
in the Dan area, encountered Israel's affluent society, its restaurants and 
entertainment locales, its malls, and other signs of the Israeli bourgeoisie.  
Another issue worth mentioning in the context of Hamas as an Islamic 
movement of the Muslim Brotherhood variety is the moderating influence 
of Israeli Arabs, as a possible link between Israel and the Palestinians. For 
many years, slogans were spread about "Israeli Arabs as a bridge to peace 
between us and the Arabs." Most of these slogans, which were usually 
voiced by "consultants on Arab issues" at professional gatherings, were 
merely lip service. They were also usually directed at our relations with 
Arab countries rather than with the Palestinians. In practice, there was 
never any real recourse to Israeli Arabs as a bridge of any kind. Quite the 
contrary, any possible affinity between them and Palestinians in the 
Territories was perceived by government circles and by academic scholars 
with great suspicion, as a sign of "radicalized Palestinization." Only over 
the last few years have both sides openly acknowledged the centrality of 
the "Israelization" process affecting Israeli Arabs, a process with 
important consequences at the political and social levels.  
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have also helped to diminish, directly or indirectly, the Israeli threat to 
Palestinians. For Palestinians, the political and social development of 
Israeli Arabs - despite feelings of discrimination and oppression, 
sometimes-intense ones, still prevalent among them - is a sign of their 
integration in Israeli society. The PLO was the first to understand this 
when, as early as the Seventies, excluded Israeli Arabs from the armed 
struggle against Israel. Gradually, the PLO assigned them the political role 
of influencing Israeli public opinion by exploiting the rules of the Israeli 
political game as well as through demography.  
They were aided in this, although not deliberately, by the Israeli 
Communist party, which acted both as a catalyst and a barrier concerning 
three important developments. The first was its recognition of the state of 
Israel as concretizing the self-determination of the Jews in the land of 
Israel, and the need to struggle for the establishment of a Palestinian state 
next to Israel rather than instead of it. The second was the party's attempt 
to direct the Arab minority in Israel to seek maximal integration, making 
the struggle for equal rights a major priority. The third was to direct the 
Arab minority to struggle within the framework of the law, rigorously 
adhering to the rules of the game. Eventually, the membership became 
mostly Arab and later mostly Muslim, leaving behind the period of 
Jewish-Christian dominance in the party. The party thus acted as a barrier, 
preventing Israeli Arabs, except for isolated instances, from joining the 
Palestinian armed struggle, namely Terrorism. The process of 
"Israelization" at the social level, which could also be seen as 
"gentrification," added the dimension that made the struggle within the 
framework of the law more advantageous.  
Politically, the same signs of ethnic, ideological, and class strife 
characterizing Israeli political organization affected Arabs in Israel. This 
process has prevented all along, and will apparently continue to do so in 
the near future, the creation of a large and united Arab coalition. Social 
"gentrification" has also preserved the clannish features of Arab society in 
Israel, which have also added to the political-social-economic strife. 
Israeli Arabs have absorbed the characteristics of the majority society and, 
consciously and unconsciously, have transferred at least an acquaintance 
with these characteristics to Palestinian society in the Territories. They 
have thus served, unintentionally and certainly not consciously, and 
clearly not as emissaries of the Israeli government, as a kind of "bridge to 
peace."  
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into two rival movements, has intensified divisions among Israeli Arabs. 
The Islamic movement in Israel, which is also an offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is a twin of Hamas except for the violence, and some of its 
growth was influenced and perhaps directed by the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. But the Islamic movement in Israel, 
and particularly under the influence of Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, 
has always remained within the political consensus acceptable to the 
decisive majority of Israeli Arabs: the independent Palestinian state must 
be established beside rather than instead of Israel. For its leaders and 
members, this will be the reality until the establishment of one great 
Islamic state in the "messianic era" that will encompass the whole Arab 
world and swallow up Israel, either physically or through cultural 
strangulation. This Islamic "messianic era" will be, as Sheikh Yassin has 
declared, "a matter for the coming generations." Hamas, like the Islamic 
movement in Israel, may be descending from the "Olympus" of a solution 
to all the problems and misfortunes of the Islamic world, to the narrow 
domain of a direct Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, and to the limitations 
arising from taking into account the yearnings of most residents of the 
Territories. Furthermore, it must be noted in this context that some leaders 
of the Islamic movement in Israel were in close contact with Sheikh 
Yassin during his imprisonment. The Israeli citizen closest to him through 
these years was a lawyer, Abd al-Malik Dahamshe, who is today an MK. 
Dahamshe supports Darwish within the Islamic movement, namely, the 
faction that was more willing to accept the Israeli rules of the game and 
even stand for election, which was the reason for the split. Sheikh Darwish 
himself was also in contact with Ahmad Yassin, directly or through 
Dahamshe. Both may, now and in the future, be able to influence certain 
attitudes of Hamas in the new circumstances created with Yassin's release 
and his return to lead the movement.  
Another factor worth noting in the context of a possible hiatus in Hamas' 
violent activity is the price that will be demanded from Israel in exchange, 
beyond the concessions agreed in the settlement with the national 
leadership. Almost the only "goods" of any worth to Palestinians in the 
Territories in general, and to Hamas supporters in particular, are the 
Palestinian prisoners. This is a matter of the utmost importance in 
Palestinian society, and the Israeli public may not be fully aware of its 
significance. These "goods" are not only a means for attaining political 
aims in the reconciliation process, but a crucial criterion in the 
mobilization of Palestinian public opinion to continue developing 
expectations about the future. The prisoners' issue is also part of Israel's 
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but Israel appears to be much less sensitive to this question than the 
Palestinians. An intelligent handling of this topic might broaden the public 
level of support for the process, putting pressure on Hamas and perhaps 
increasing its readiness to join, even only partially, the process of Israeli-
Palestinian reconciliation.  
One factor may set back the whole process, and certainly the chances of 
any change, if at all possible: the issue of Jerusalem. For many Palestinian 
and Arab Muslims, a unique holiness has gradually come to surround 
Jerusalem in general and the Temple Mount (Bayt al-Maqdas) in 
particular over the last three decades. "The holiness of Jerusalem" in the 
Islamic, Arab, and Palestinian myth of our time, which far exceeds the 
myth surrounding Jerusalem as known to us from traditional Islam, has 
largely replaced the attitude toward Israel as the unifying element. This 
issue requires independent research and separate consideration, but is a 
matter of almost universal agreement in the Arab world and among 
Palestinians. Gradually but steadily, the political-national demand for the 
proclamation of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future independent 
Palestinian State has blended with the holiness of the Temple Mount in the 
Arab world.  
In sum, it appears that we are at the height of an ongoing process, in which 
both parties affect each other more than they are aware of. The very 
existence of a process is an important move, not only for the future of both 
nations and the chances of a political-national settlement. It is important 
and vital as part of the Israeli struggle against Palestinian political 
violence, including that of Hamas, but it also forces Israeli society to 
embrace the hallmark of Hamas - Sabr -"endurance."  
The struggle against Palestinian Islamic terrorism must be waged in a far 
more systematic and intelligent fashion, taking into account not only the 
"pinpoint target" of foiling specific plots, a justified concern in its own 
right. It should begin by bracing Israeli society and public opinion into 
recognizing that other answers, besides "running after it," are also 
available. Steps must be taken to lessen the "demonization" of Islamic 
terrorism and the enormous weight it has assumed in Israeli society.  
The most effective way of contending with Islamic terrorism and with 
Hamas is to block as far as possible, elements that affect Palestinian public 
opinion in the Territories, bringing it to raise its threshold of expectations 
from Hamas as a social movement integrated within the short-term 
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Israeli society must learn to "sleep with the enemy," relying on the 
assumption that this enemy, including its most extremist elements, is 
capable of it as long as the present process of compromise continues.  
*****  
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